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Careful consideration of the evolutionary implications of competition and 
cooperation has significant repercussions for social dominance in humans across 
the life span. For example, two broad and phenomenologically distinct classes 
of resource control strategy appear to emerge in early childhood and persist 
through adulthood; namely, prosocial and coercive. Though these behavior 
classes are traditionally considered to be opposites in (non-evolutionary) psy-
chology, they may ultimately function similarly. The present paper summarizes 
a novel theory of social dominance, exemplifies its utility by sketching an em-
pirical program of research on children and adolescents, and reviews possible 
implications for traditional views of child behavior. 
Keywords: social dominance, evolution, aggression, peer relationships, 
personality. 
 
Competencia y desarrollo social y de la personalidad: algunas 
consecuencias de tomar a Darwin en serio  
Una valoración cuidadosa de las implicaciones evolucionistas de la 
competencia y la cooperación tiene importantes repercusiones en el análisis de 
los procesos de dominancia social entre seres humanos a lo largo del ciclo vital. 
Por ejemplo, dos grandes estrategias para el control de recursos, aparentemente 
distintas, parecen surgir durante la infancia temprana y persistir a lo largo de 
la vida adulta; concretamente, la prosocial y la coercitiva. Aunque estos dos 
tipos de comportamiento se han considerado tradicionalmente como opuestos 
en psicología (no-evolucionista), pueden estar desempeñando, en última ins-
tancia, una función parecida. En este artículo, se presenta un resumen de una 
nueva teoría de la dominancia social, se ejemplifica su utilidad esbozando un 
programa de investigación con niños y adolescentes, y se revisan sus posibles 
implicaciones para una concepción clásica del comportamiento infantil. 
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 The birth of evolutionary psychology has led many to ask, was psychology 
ever non-evolutionary? The answer is an unequivocal “yes”, and in some do-
mains it still is (Pinker, 2002). But how has evolutionary theory impacted de-
velopmental psychology? 
 The present paper explores the influence of evolutionary theories on de-
velopmental thought and makes the case that natural selection implies that 
competition is at the heart of social and personality development. A theory of 
social dominance is presented as an example of how a modern evolutionary 
framework can be integrated with contemporary developmental models. 
 
 
Evolution and developmental psychology 
 
 Many developmental psychologists have the impression that Darwin 
deeply influenced developmental thought. Prominent Yale developmentalist, 
William Kessen, for example, opened a chapter of The Child (1965) with, (it is 
hard to imagine) «...what scholars thought of children before the publication 
and slow assimilation of The Origin of Species (1859)». Kessen claimed that 
Darwin introduced the study of change to psychology, the very essence of 
development. Even still, Darwin’s baby biography (1877) frequently is hailed 
in introductory textbooks as the first systematic study of a child’s behavior.  
 Not only was Darwin’s baby biography predated by 90 years by German 
scientist Dieterich Tiedemann (1787), the evolutionary concepts addressed by 
several of the founding fathers of developmental psychology (e.g., James, 
McDougall, Freud, and Baldwin) were discussed in the literature long before 
the writings of Charles Darwin (1859). The late 19th century was a hotbed of 
biological argument and theorizing. Accordingly, there were several treatises 
regarding mechanisms of phyletic change including Darwin’s “natural selec-
tion”. Two stand out as noteworthy: Lamarck theory of the inheritance of ac-
quired characteristics (1809) and Ernst Haeckel´s Biogenetic Law (1866). 
Though Lamarck’s contribution has long been discredited (early glimmers of 
doubt were emerging as early as the late 1880s; Charlesworth, 1992), 
Haeckel’s Biogenetic Law had lasting influence still visible today. In some 
senses then, it may be correct to say that early developmentalists, while per-
haps evolutionary, were Haeckelian rather than Darwinian. 
 Haeckel famously proposed that the stages of ontogeny repeat the adult 
forms of animals lower on the phylogenetic scale by way of “terminal addi-
tion”; the human embryo passes through the stage resembling an adult fish 
because the fish provided the foundation for later adaptations that eventually 
led to land life, mammals, and then humans. Development, Haeckel argued, 
accelerates over time such that ancestral features were pushed back to earlier 
stages of the embryos of descendant species (“condensation”). The Biogenetic 
Law actually meshed nicely not only with the older Lamarckian notion of 
“inheritance of acquired characteristics”, but also with the even older vision of 
the hierarchical order of life as reflected in “the great chain of being”. This 
model made a good deal of sense at the time; one can see the lowly beasts 
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striving towards perfection (as represented by Man), as humans strive to be 
Godly. As Haeckel pointed out, one could see the remnants of such lowly 
beasts in the human embryo, leading him to famously claim “ontogeny reca-
pitulates phylogeny”, or the individual’s development summarizes the develop-
ment of the species.  
 The relationship between ontogeny and phylogeny is complex (see 
Gould, 1977 for example), and has caused a great deal of understandable con-
fusion over the last century (see Morss, 1990 for a detailed treatment). On the 
dark side, the religious and biological linear ordering of life fueled Herbert 
Spencer’s racist agenda of human perfection, the application of his notion of 
“survival of the fittest” to human society (i.e., “Social Darwinism”, so named 
after Spencer’s reading of Origin of Species, but outlined well before Origin’s 
publication). Nonetheless, the Biogenetic Law continued to be very popular 
well beyond the turn of the 20th century and the recapitulationist heuristic is 
evident in many older psychological theories. For example, the developing 
human was not only believed to pass through the stages of other species, but 
also through the history of mankind. G. S. Hall argued that the natural pro-
gression of children through these stages, including that of “savages”, needed 
to be considered in childhood education. Freud linked oral and anal stages of 
sexual development with what he believed to be our quadrapedal ancestry, and 
he presumed that repressed primitive core stages to be part of the adult brain. 
Furthermore, he arranged the neuroses in phyletic order and attributed narcis-
sism to the “primitive races”. Even the child rearing guru Dr. Spock (1957) 
described the child as progressing “through the whole of human history”.  
 The misapplication of evolutionary theory (or theories) leads to a sense of 
newness to “evolutionary developmental psychology”. Outside of attachment 
theory (e.g., Bowlby, 1969), one sees few serious (correct) integrations of 
evolution by natural selection and child development until fairly recently 
(Bjorklund & Pellegrini, 2002; Ellis & Bjorklund, 2005; but see Fishbein, 
1976; Bruner, Jolly, & Sylva, 1976). Though evolutionary psychology tends to 
presently focus on universals (e.g., Buss, 2007), evolutionary developmental 
psychology is well-poised to integrate developmental psychology’s interest in 
individual differences with evolutionary principles (see Belsky, Steinberg, & 
Draper, 1991, Boyce & Ellis, 2005; Ellis, 2004), as the present application 
hopes to show. 
 
Natural selection and competition 
 
 What set Darwin’s evolutionary theory apart from the other evolutionary 
theories of his day was the inspiration of demographer/economist, Thomas 
Malthus, whose 1803 treatise argued that population growth is constrained by 
available resources. Consequently, Darwin believed that more individuals are 
born than survive to reproduce, and variations in phenotypes were related to 
differential survival and reproduction. Natural selection then can be characterized 
as competition between phenotypes. It is by no means the only force driving 
evolution, but it is the only one that is relevant to this discussion. 
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 The competitive essence of natural selection suggests, at least at some 
level, that individualism, selfishness, and/or egocentrism are inherent to or-
ganisms and this individualism is well captured within many of theories of 
psychological importance (e.g., parent-infant conflict, sexual selection, jealousy, 
homicide). Where competitive aspects of evolution have had less impact are theo-
ries concerning the development of children. Developmentalists have typically 
preferred to focus on the bright side of development and as such align their 
philosophical roots more closely with Rousseau than with Hobbes (though 
Freud of course was a notable exception). Concerning negative behaviors such 
as aggression, for example, developmentalists typically look for perturbations 
that push a child off track of “normal” development (e.g., goodness). 
 
Cooperation as a competitive venture 
 
 Darwin’s “struggle for existence” (Darwin, 1859) creates powerful and 
influential imagery of aggressive competition both within and between species. 
This alignment is especially unambiguous in the sexual selection literature 
(male-male competition for females; Darwin, 1871; Trivers, 1972; Pellegrini & 
Archer, 2005) outlining sexual dimorphism for size and strength. This gladato-
rial perspective («...the strongest, the swiftest, and the cunningest live to fight 
another day», Huxley, 1888) heavily influence European naturalists and popu-
lar writers (e.g., Lorenz, 1967) and made the evolution of altruism one of the 
greatest quandaries in theoretical biology. 
 Yet, writings on the evolution of other-oriented behavior can be found as 
early as the turn to the 20th century. Anarchist Russian prince Pyotr Kropotkin 
(1902) contended that under harsh conditions and low population density, 
cooperation would evolve over aggressive competition. According to Kropot-
kin’s minority view, the “struggle for existence” also entailed individual 
against environment and that this struggle could best be won via mutual aid.  
 It was not until Robert Trivers’s seminal work on reciprocal altruism 
(1971) that individual level selection (cf. group selection; e.g., Wynne-
Edwards, 1962; Wilson, 2006) was united with a viable theory of other-
oriented behavior (see also Hamilton, 1964). Here, “altruism” bears limited cost 
when one considers delayed benefits; that is, social individuals perform altruistic 
acts with the implicit expectation that favors will be reciprocated. According 
to Trivers, social emotions such as trust and liking evolved to regulate these 
exchange processes. For example, we are disinclined toward those we do not 
trust to reciprocate and those who fail to reciprocate fall quickly out of favor.  
 Social Exchange theories are certainly not unknown in psychology, and 
similar to Trivers’ perspective, claim that we are sensitive to inequities in ex-
change processes (e.g., Byrne, 1964; Walster, Walster, & Bersheid, 1978). 
From both perspectives, the appeal of a potential social partner is a function of 
what s/he brings to the relationship as a commodity (e.g., status, information, 
social connections, or wealth). These perspectives –while generally not em-
braced by developmentalists perhaps in light of their inherent cynical view of 
social relationships in general and friendships in particulars– are central to the 
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theory of social dominance presented below because they help explain the 
proximal mechanisms that maintain the social centrality of a socially dominant 
individual, even if s/he is aggressive. In the end, these individualist perspec-
tives all suggest that we pick our friends, alliances, social networks in part as a 
result of a calculus determining what these people can do for us. Thus, in a 
very real sense, material goals can be achieved via sociality as well as aggres-
sion.  
 
Dualism in human nature 
 
 One can construe the above to implicate a dualism in human motivation 
and behavior (see also Freud, 1930; Bakan, 1966). This dualism –that com-
petitive forces give rise to both antagonistic and other oriented behavioral 
strategies– underlies the present theoretical perspective, Resource Control 
Theory (RCT; Hawley, 1999a).  
 According to the outline laid out above, successful competition can be 
achieved directly or indirectly. Direct means are relatively straight forward 
and can be seen readily in nature; that is, resources are sought via agonistic 
contests, for example. Consideration for the goals and motivations of others 
are simply by-passed. Instrumental aggression is a very direct antisocial 
means of resource access in zero-sum conditions. Indirect means of resource 
competition derive from evolutionary models of cooperation. Here, competi-
tion takes on a more non-zero sum quality; both interactants (or more) stand to 
gain in this cooperative or reciprocal context (see also Wilson, 2006). Instead 
of bypassing the social group as direct means do, indirect strategies exploit the 
mediating effect of the social group to access resources prosocially.  
 The bulk of psychology considers antisociality and prosociality opposite 
ends of a single continuum and, as such, assumes that they serve opposing 
functions. In contrast, here they are considered to serve the same function, or 
“two sides of the same coin” (Hawley, 2002; Charlesworth, 1996). As a con-
sequence they may be assumed to be either independent or positively related 
(for extended discussion see Hawley, 1999a, 2002, 2007).  
 Resource control theory attempts to capture this dualism concretely in its 
translation of these direct and indirect strategies. That is, RCT posits that 
competition can come in at least two broad forms. So called coercive strate-
gies of resource control are direct, aversive, and immediate (e.g., taking, 
threatening) and as such are equal to traditional conceptions of social domi-
nance in the ethological literature (e.g., Strayer & Strayer, 1976; Bernstein, 
1981). Prosocial strategies of resource control, finding their theoretical roots 
in evolutionary approaches to cooperation, include reciprocity, cooperation, 
unsolicited help, and positive alliance formation (i.e., friendships) –all behaviors 
that can serve successful resource acquisition with the approval of others. In 
contrast to coercive strategies, they are indirect, prolonged, and generally win 
positive group regard.  
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Theoretical and methodological implications  
for human social dominance and power  
 
 The above outlined approach to social dominance has several important 
theoretical ramifications for human social dominance and avenues of scholarly 
pursuit. Dominance hierarchies have been proven to be a highly visible central 
organizing feature of social behavior across taxa. If their effect is as profound 
as biological approaches might suggest and competition is a central organizing 
feature of social groups, then we ought to see social dominance play out in 
human social groups, even in early childhood. Our research program has cen-
tered on social dominance as an aspect of relationships, distinguishing the 
form of the behavior from its function, investigating the utility of a person-
centered approach, and exhibiting continuity between species by demonstrating 
the social centrality of the dominant individual. Each of these points will be 
addressed in turn. 
 
Social dominance and interpersonal relationships 
 
 First, social dominance describes a relative differential in competitive 
ability, and as such is an aspect of a relationship. The relationship aspect of 
social dominance had long been overlooked by ethologists who failed to explore 
competitive asymmetries within a complex system of interpersonal relationships, 
and instead focused on hierarchies (see Vaughn, 1999 for extended discussion). 
That is, social behavior, including that involving a contested resource is highly 
dependent on the identities of the interactants, their personal characteristics, 
and the unique history of their interactions (Hawley & Little, 1999). More-
over, because ethology derived from zoology, ethologists neglected aspects of 
human functioning long measured from psychological traditions. Thus, rather 
than focusing simply on gender, age, and size, we can (and should) measure so-
cial cognitions, personality, cognitive age, morality, etc., as predictors of social 
dominance (see for example, Hawley & Little, 1999; Hawley, 2003a, b).  
 To exemplify these points and to explore whether pursuing of intragroup 
competition made any sense at all, our first foray into the social dominance 
construct asked whether dominance is something that is of psychological sig-
nificance to members of a social group (Hawley & Little, 1999). It is one thing 
to show that young children can be ordered in a hierarchy in terms of contest 
wins; it is quite another to demonstrate that the outcome of these wins influ-
ence social behavior outside of the competitive setting. If the social dominance 
construct is of any utility, we should see, for example, children of “middle rank” 
changing their behavior in the presence of those dominant to themselves rela-
tive to those who are subordinate. Secondly, we sought to know whether relative 
competitive ability could be predicted with psychological traits beyond the 
usual suspects of size and gender.  
 For this study, we recruited 1.5 – 3.2 year olds and their families from an 
institute-affiliated day care facility in Berlin, Germany, comprising two care 
groups of eight children. We assessed cognitive age (Bayley Scales of Infant 
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Development, 1993) and parent-rated temperament (Toddler Temperament 
Scale; Saile, 1987), along with size (height and weight), gender, and time 
spent at the daycare center. Social dominance was assessed by teacher ratings 
and observations of group play. For our outcome behavioral interactions, we 
borrowed a measurement paradigm used in social psychology (i.e., the Social 
Relations Model; Kenney & LaVoie, 1984) which means experimentally cre-
ating a “round robin” design where each child is repeatedly paired with a sin-
gle peer and filmed for a set time (here, 5 minutes) in a semi-structured play 
encounter. Multiple dyadic interactions allow the exploration of the effects of 
each participant along with effects due to their unique combination. Our coding 
schema was ethologically inspired; we recorded micro-level behaviors such as 
directed comments, gazing, taking, thwarting, requesting, imitating, complying, 
etc. The end result was a rich dataset with the dyad as the unit of analysis (making 
the most of small groups).  
 This work demonstrated that social dominance as relative competitive 
ability mediates the relationship between individual-level attributes (i.e., cog-
nitive age, persistence, gender, tenure) and social behavior in an experimental 
play setting (directing, passive watching, imitating, and social play). As one 
would expect from a relationship perspective, dyadic behavioral outcomes 
were also a function of how well the interactants knew each other. Moreover, 
we detected how children’s behavior changed depending on the rank of their 
social partner. With peers dominant to themselves, there was more passive 
watching. With peers subordinate to themselves, they were more directing. 
Thus, relative competitive ability appears to be meaningful to children in their 
dyadic interactions in everyday play contexts, even before the age of three.  
 
Function vs. form 
 
 Breaking from traditional perspectives, resource control theory shifts the 
focus from the form of behavior (what the behavior looks like) to the function 
of behavior (see Hawley 1999a,b for extended discussions). By focusing on 
resource acquisition first (the underlying function), we can then pose ques-
tions about how individuals (or species, or cultures) control resources (i.e., 
strategies employed or the structure of behavior), and how these strategies 
change over time (via developmental differentiation, social learning, etc.). The 
theory suggests that humans employ unrefined coercive strategies like other 
mammals, but diverge from other species with the development of strategies 
that necessitate a theory of mind and other higher order cognitive abilities 
(e.g., some of the more sophisticated prosocial strategies and deception).  
 While well-differentiated strategies may not be evident in very young 
children (e.g., less than three), by the ages of three to five one can explore how 
dominant children dominate to determine whether prosocial and coercive be-
havior are related to resource use (Hawley, 2002). To this end we used a 
“block design”, a relative of the round robin design described above. Here we 
paired children rated as dominant by teachers with multiple subordinate part-
ners. Our semi-structured play situation was designed expressly to pull for 
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resource-controlling behavior; namely, we presented a game-like task with 
two unequal roles. We reasoned that the primary role of the game would be a 
resource over which children would compete. How would dominant children 
secure and maintain the primary role for themselves?  
 Here, prosocial strategies were defined as making suggestions, issuing 
polite requests, and offering unsolicited help (the play material is thus effec-
tively commandeered). Coercive strategies involved taking, aggression, and 
insults. As we expected, both classes of behavior were associated with occu-
pation of the primary role (r = .53 for prosocial strategies, r = .46 for coer-
cive), and both strategies were highly related to each other (r = .67). In fact, 
prosocial strategies were employed at twice the frequency of coercive strate-
gies. In the end, socially dominant children occupied the primary role 71% of 
the time when occupation could be determined, while subordinate children 
only occupied it 19% of the time. Speaking to the idea that competition out-
comes should be highly visible, teacher ratings of social dominance and con-
trol of the play material in the observation occasion were correlated .67. 
 By the time children are in late elementary school, they can self-report 
their own behavior and intentions. Questionnaire items for resource control 
query children about their success at goal attainment. Prosocial strategies in-
clude “I get what I want by reciprocating”, “...by being nice”, or “...promising 
friendship”. Coercive strategies are indicated by items such as, “I get what I 
want by taking”, “...threatening” or “...bullying”. For adolescents we can use 
such items for peer nomination (e.g., “Who gets what they want by...”), 
friendship inventory (“My friend gets what they want by...”), and, of course, 
teacher reports at all ages (Hawley, 2003 a,b). 
 
A person-centered typology 
 
 A third implication melds methodological concerns with the theoretical; 
namely, because resource control theory rests upon two foundational strategic 
orientations, we can now consider types of individuals who share common 
patterns of strategy employment (i.e., a person-centered approach; Hawley, 
Johnson et al., 2007). On the basis of the relative degree of endorsement (self-
report) or employment (teacher or peer report) of the strategies, we have de-
fined subgroups of individuals depending on their placement in distributions 
divided into tertiles; bistrategic controllers by definition are in the top tertiles of 
both prosocial and coercive strategies, coercive controllers are in the top tertile 
of coercive strategies only, prosocial controllers are in the top tertile of proso-
cial strategies only, and noncontrollers are in the lowest tertile of both strate-
gies. Typical controllers comprise the remainder. Regardless of whether the 
types are formed via teacher report (Hawley, 2003a), self-report (e.g., Hawley, 
2003b) or peer nomination (Hawley, Card, & Little, 2007), bistrategic control-
lers are the most successful at resource control by far, followed by prosocial 
and coercive controllers, with the non-controllers being the least successful. 
Thus, bistrategic controllers are considered to be of the highest social domi-
nance status and noncontrollers the lowest from this perspective by definition.  
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 Thus far, a key goal of this research program has been to explore the per-
sonal and social outcomes and attributes of different types of resource controllers. 
In principle, how strategies are wielded should reveal driving motivational 
orientations (e.g., extrinsic motivation to attract others), personality (e.g., 
agreeableness), and social skills (e.g., emotional intelligence) of the actors. 
Not surprisingly, prosocial controllers display positive and attractive attributes 
such as intrinsic motivations for pursuing friendships (e.g., for joy and per-
sonal fulfillment; Hawley, Little, Pasupathi, 2002), agreeableness, and social 
skills. As a result, they are well-liked by peers and enjoy intimate, high-
quality friendships (Hawley, Little, & Card, 2007). In contrast, coercive con-
trollers are aggressive, hostile, unskilled (Hawley, 2003b), and motivated by 
power and popularity. Consequently, their friendships are low-quality and 
conflictual.  
 Bistrategic controllers perhaps make the greatest novel contribution to our 
understanding of human behavior. In part because of their dual strategy ap-
proach, they are by far the most successful at resource control. Yet another 
contribution to their success is their motivational profile. Like coercive con-
trollers, bistrategics are aggressive, manipulative, and extrinsically motivated 
to pursue relationships. They have a high need for recognition for their ac-
complishments and place the highest value on the material world of all the 
groups (Hawley, 2003b; Hawley, Shorey, & Alderman, 2008). At the same 
time, they appear to have many of the skills of prosocial controllers such as a 
sophisticated understanding of others and a moral attunement (Hawley, 2003 
a, b). This combination of skills balanced with aggression appears to embody 
the dualism of human nature described above. 
 What are we going to think of the decidedly successful yet manipulative 
individual? Some imagine the psychopath or social deviant while others envi-
sion the “Chief Executive Officer” or politician. Nowhere is the drive to 
evaluate the bistrategic controller in moral terms stronger than in developmen-
tal circles, a topic to which I will return shortly. Before we address how they 
are evaluated by researchers, we will address how they are evaluated by the 
social group.  
 
Social dominance and social centrality 
 
 Because resource control theory was ultimately derived from the animal 
behavior literature (Hawley, 1999a), it predicts that the socially dominant indi-
viduals of a social group will hold social power and be socially central because 
of their evident mastery over the material world. That is, effective resource 
control should attract others (i.e., the social centrality hypothesis; Hawley, 
1999a). Not only does instrumental competence in the material world win 
admiration, but resource holders bring much to the table in terms of social 
exchange processes.  
 Our studies with preschoolers and adolescents have repeatedly shown that 
bistrategic controllers garner a good deal of positive social attention (as do 
prosocial controllers), despite their high levels of aggression. When preschoolers 
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report “who they like”, bistrategic controllers win among the most nomina-
tions (and coercive controllers the least; Hawley, 2003a). This pattern is repli-
cated in adolescence, where bistrategic controllers not only win “like nomina-
tions”, but also win among the most “s/he is my best friend” nominations, and 
are seen as popular and high status (Hawley, Little, & Card, 2007). These pat-
terns are not easy to explain from predominant developmental psychopa-
thology perspectives that hold aggression to be repellent and thus a risk factor 
(Coie & Dodge, 1998). We may wish to believe that children and adolescents 
don’t see the aggression of the bistrategic, or that bistrategic behavior is nearer 
to assertion than aggression. But bistrategics are described by peers as aggres-
sive and their friends report being targets of aggression within the relationship 
(Hawley, Little, & Card, 2007). Moreover, teachers rate them as physically 
attractive, despite being fully aware of their negative behavior (Hawley, John-
son et al., 2007). Coercive controllers, in contrast, are rated as the least attrac-
tive by teachers. People who don’t know the children do not differentiate the 
two groups when rating photographs. To us this implies that teachers ulti-
mately view bistrategic controllers favorably and coercive controllers unfa-
vorably because of their behavior. 
 
 
Implications for the developmental literature 
 
 The research program described above may raise thought-provoking 
questions regarding values and beliefs presently predominant in the field; 
namely, one’s philosophical orientation, one’s abhorrence of aggression, as-
sumptions about gender, and the role of context in a biologically based con-
struct. Each will be taken in turn. 
 
Moral neutrality vs. melioration (Hobbes vs Rousseau) 
 
 The theory of evolution by natural selection a lá Darwin is a morally neu-
tral theoretical orientation. To many, however, moral neutrality –that is, failure 
to take a moral stance– implies wickedness. That so many are led to such con-
clusions has been the bane of the theory since its inception. Historically, reli-
gious conservatives have claimed that the theory denies the human soul and 
special creation, and antagonists from the left claim that the theory justifies 
human violence and male domination. Most scientists operating within an evo-
lutionary perspective deny both of these allegations (but see Dawkins, 2006, 
for a contrasting view). 
 In contrast, developmental psychology has characteristically adopted a 
morally non-neutral stance. One can still clearly see the Rousseaunian doctrine 
of the noble savage (Émile, 1762) inherent in the bulk of modern developmen-
tal work, especially in the social domain. Recall that Rousseau maintained that 
uncivilized (i.e., untainted) man is peaceful, egalitarian, and in possession of 
inborn moral instincts. The darker side of humanity (e.g., competition, greed, 
violence) stems from the corrupting influence of modern civilization. Consis-
 Competition and social and personality development: Some consequences of taking Darwin seriously 
Anuario de Psicología, vol. 39, nº 2, septiembre 2008, pp. 193-208 
© 2008, Universitat de Barcelona, Facultat de Psicologia 
203 
tent with this belief, predominant modern views of child social behavior and 
development implicitly assume that with proper care (e.g., minimal corrup-
tion), children will grow to be moral, other-oriented, and non-aggressive. An-
tisocial tendencies (broadly defined) are held to arise from poor parenting, 
deviant peers, impoverished urban environments, or toxic media influences. 
Consequent to this deep philosophical orientation, child psychology through-
out the 20th century adopted a “social engineering ethos” and an ameliorative 
mindset (Smith, 2007; Charlesworth, 1992); developmentalists focused their 
attention on bettering potentially corrupting environments to improve child 
development outcomes and thereby society. 
 In contrast to the bulk of 20th century child psychology, Freud (1930/1961) 
took a less rosy view of human development which partially underlies ill-will 
towards his theory today. Namely, one sees the unmistakable influence of 
Thomas Hobbes, who, though preceding Rousseau, adopted a nearly opposite 
view; namely, that man’s natural propensity to behave out of self interest leads 
to perpetual struggle, and that societal controls (e.g., socialization) are neces-
sary to enforce a collective will (Hobbes, 1651/1885). Like Freud, evolution-
ists by and large believe that human nature can lead to interactions marked by 
aggression and self-servingness, and much of this aggression can (and should) 
be controlled by constraints constructed by the social group at large (e.g., 
Pinker, 2007). At the same time, evolutionists more so than traditionally 
trained developmentalists allow that aggression may be functional, regardless 
of the moral evaluation of the act (see e.g., Pellegrini, 2007; Vaughn & San-
tos, 2007). 
 
Aggression and social reception 
 
 Nowhere is this “morally neutral stance” more evident than in the study 
of aggression. Traditional developmental orientations deriving from psychopa-
thology perspectives assume a priori that aggression is evil, and consequent to 
this malevolence the social group will castigate the aggressive individual. Ac-
cordingly, coercive strategies of resource control, though indisputably effec-
tive, are generally held to be “antisocial” from conventional psychological 
perspectives. Several well-established lines in the developmental literature 
have shown that early childhood aggression puts the child at risk for poor de-
velopmental outcomes, most germane to the discussion at hand, peer rejection 
(Coie, Dodge, & Kupershmidt, 1990; Coie & Dodge, 1998). Yet, I have pro-
posed that at least in some contexts, this apparently maladaptive behavior in 
the proximal sense is in fact adaptive evolutionarily. How can this contradic-
tion be reconciled?  
 The social centrality hypothesis of resource control theory suggests that 
aggression –in the service of effective resource control– is not as socially re-
pellent as is suggested by the literature or conventional wisdom, and to as-
sume so may be an oversimplification. Work since the mid-90’s has shown 
that a subset of aggressors can be socially skilled (Sutton, Smith, Swettenham, 
1999a,b; Hawley, 2003a,b) and socially appealing (Rodkin, Farmer, Pearl, van 
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Aker, 2000; Hawley 2003a, b; Cairns & Cairns, 1994). Though variable fo-
cused approaches (i.e., those that focus on relationships among variables via 
correlations and regressions) still tend to support the view that aggression 
leads to peer censure (e.g., Cillessen & Mayeaux, 2004), person-centered ap-
proaches (i.e., those that focus on types of individuals who score commonly 
on variables of interest) demonstrate that there are subtypes of aggressive in-
dividuals who fare quite well. This latter point is made clear by comparing the 
profiles and outcomes associated with the resource control typology described 
above. Namely, there are two groups of aggressive youths; bistrategic and 
coercive controllers. Despite their similarity on some dimensions, the social 
experiences of the bistrategic controllers and coercive controllers are quite 
distinct already by the age of five.  
 Thus, RCT attempts to resolve this quandary by focusing on the social 
dominance achieved by these individuals first, and their aggression only secon-
darily. By doing so, we can turn back to the social centrality hypothesis: Domi-
nant individuals of many species command a good deal of attention from the so-
cial group due to their evident mastery of the material world. They are looked 
to, imitated, and sought out social partners (Hawley, 1999a; Chance, 1976). 
Additionally, in terms of social exchange parlance, they bring a good deal of 
material rewards and power to relationships. In the end, the benefits of associating 
with them appear to outweigh the substantial costs; they make very good 
friends, but very bad enemies. 
 In the end, do we characterize these bistrategic children as “good” or 
“bad”? Developmentalists driven to improve the lives of children may lean 
toward the latter over the former. I only wish to conclude that bistrategic chil-
dren are probably not the ones attracting the bulk of attention from teachers 
and school service professionals in terms of intervention services targeting 
aggression. Those children would be the unskilled coercive controllers and the 
anxious, withdrawn non-controllers. 
 
Social dominance and gender 
 
 Aggression and social dominance evoke thoughts of masculinity. As men-
tioned above, zoology-based ethological approaches to social dominance tended 
to strongly align social dominance with overt aggression or agonistic contexts. 
When dominance is approached this way, it tends to naturally favor males. In 
contrast, the present approach allows for, indeed stipulates, alternative strate-
gies of resource control and dominance. If one assumes that females are more 
prosocially oriented than males, then would females thus have an alternate 
legitimate path to resource control? 
 Sexual selection theory outlines an unequivocally gendered view of com-
petition. Based on differential parental investments, males are expected to be 
larger, more status striving, and more aggressive than females (see e.g., Buss, 
1988; Geary, 1998). In contrast, RCT has been rather agnostic regarding gender 
differences and instead adopts the minority perspective of anthropologist, Sarah 
Blaffer Hrdy (1981/1999): «Visionaries of male-male competition stressed the 
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imagery of primate females ... so preoccupied with motherhood that they have 
little respite to influence their species’ social organization. Alternate possibili-
ties were neglected: that selection favored females who were assertive, sexu-
ally active, or highly competitive, who adroitly manipulated male consorts, or 
who were as strongly motivated to gain high social status...» (Hrdy, 1999; pp. 
13-14). 
 Dovetailing beautifully with Hrdy’s contribution is the work in develop-
mental circles on aggression in girls. Although boys and men have long been 
considered more physically aggressive than girls and women (Maccoby & 
Jacklin, 1974; Lorenz, 1967) and more lethal in their aggression (Daly & Wil-
son, 1994; Wrangham & Peterson, 1996), more subtle forms of aggression that 
target the victims social standing or social well being appear to be the modus 
operandi of girls (e.g., Björkqvist & Niemelä, 1992; Crick & Grotpeter, 
1995). Thus, rather than succumbing to clichés and concluding coercive stra-
tegies are the province of boys while prosocial strategies are that of the girls, 
we now can entertain that girls may be in fact quite aggressive, albeit in less 
visible ways.  
 Are males more resource controlling than females? In all work, including 
our own, it appears that they are. More interesting to us, however, is within 
gender variability. In study after study, we find bistrategic controllers to be 
equally male and female, even though the groups are derived by exactly the 
same criteria. Moreover, dominant bistrategic males and females are more 
alike than they are different; they are both highly resource directed, relation-
ally and physically aggressive, and enjoy positive reception from their peers 
(Hawley, Card, & Little, 2008). Thus it appears that males have little advan-
tage at achieving very high social dominance when both prosocial and coer-
cive strategies are considered. In the end we conclude that social dominance is 
well-served by employing a wide range of behaviors and adopting all manner 
of skills and motivations characteristic of humans in general.  
 
Learning winningness (and losingness): The role of context 
 
 Typically, writers in evolutionary psychology are searching for “human 
universals” (Buss, 2007). The present theory of social dominance is unusual 
because it is one of individual differences. Social dominance is an aspect of a 
relationship; the presence of others is a necessary condition for one to prevail. 
Thus, social dominance, or competitive superiority, is highly dependent on the 
composition of the social group and thus cannot be a genetically coded trait of 
the individual per se (see also Bernstein, 1981). At the same time, asymmetry 
of competitive ability can be predicted by the interpersonal characteristics of 
the individuals involved, some of which may have genetic underpinnings, 
such as persistence, extraversion, and pugnacity. 
 Others predictors of relative competitive ability may be entirely context 
dependent. For example, superiority may depend on the win-loss histories of 
the competitors. Doubtless the form and intensity of future attempts at re-
source control are influenced by the learning history of the individual. Early 
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loss experiences in competitive contexts (such as preschool classrooms or 
sibling circles) could intensify (indeed cause) individual differences in persis-
tence. On this point, early developmentalists manipulated the experience of 
characteristic non-winners. These experiences led to greater success at re-
source control in subsequent interactions (Jack, 1934). As a result of these 
experiments, Jack correctly concluded that “ascendancy” was a function of the 
individual-context interface and that such behavior could be learned. Thus, 
because controlling strategies can be created experientially (e.g., learning that 
control attempts will be effective), direct genetic mechanisms need not be 
invoked. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
  If social dominance is a central organizing feature of the social group, 
and long term behavioral propensities can develop within competitive contests, 
then it appears as though competition is at the heart of personality development. 
This evolutionary view is a bit unusual because it is an individual differences 
perspective rather than a human universals perspective. As such, RCT is ulti-
mately an evolutionary theory of human personality (Hawley, 2006).  
 The early evolutionists of the 19th century were developmentalists in that 
they looked to embryology to reveal human origins. Similarly, we cannot fully 
understand human social dominance and power without understanding the 
development of children and their behavior in peer groups. 
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